

The Gentle Force over the Pictures – Hegel's Philosophical Conception of the Imagination

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For Hegel, Aristotle's thoughts on mind and knowledge, especially in his work *On the Soul*, are "still to this day the most distinguished and unique work of speculative interest on this object" (Hegel, *Enzyklopädie* 1970, 10: 11). Accordingly, the purpose of a philosophy of mind (*Geist*) can only be to introduce the *concept* (*Begriff*) into the knowledge of mind. Hegel's effusive praise of a philosophy that is more than 2000 years old and his massive insistence on the concept, on the *logos* of knowledge, may appear oddly anachronistic in view of present theory of knowledge. Even so, 200 years after Hegel I am going to recommend precisely such a seeming anachronism and argue for the enduring and decisive value of Hegel's concept of imagination for current philosophical reflection on knowledge. What might at first look like a dusty attic will soon reveal extensive and unfamiliar treasures and offer the cornerstone for a modern philosophy of knowledge and aesthetics. Hegel's theory provides an Ariadne thread leading out of the labyrinth of conflicting opinions about the nature and role of the imagination. Here, however, I will only be able to point out a few of the basic outlines of Hegel's logic of knowledge.

1. Imagination and Mind (*Geist*)

In the special embedding in the doctrine of mind there is a serious advantage to the Hegelian conception. This relocating into the system-architectonic can only be treated cursorily. For textual support, the section *Philosophical Psychology* in Hegel's *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Science* is especially useful.

a) The imagination is held to be a special formation or developmental phase of *Geist*. The German term *Geist* denotes a philosophical, metaphysical principle that can not be adequately translated by „mind“ or „spirit“. To grasp it, one must understand it as the stages of a self-

production. This self-generation means self-determination or autonomy, the self-determination of mind as self-liberation. The formal essence of mind consists in freedom and can be grasped as a process of „freeing itself to itself“, as realization of the concept of its freedom. In this way, it makes itself free from everything that does not correspond to its concept, *free from every form that is not adequate to it*. To be free does not mean to exist alongside an other, but to come to itself.

b) This self-relation as active self-production is conceived as a logically based step-by-step movement of the activity of Geist. From the lower, abstract determinations, the higher, concrete determinations are deductively (logisch, schlüssig) generated according to the necessity of thought. In this way the previous determinations then appear as moments in the higher stages and there attain their partial validity. This logical process of grounding the progress as a return to the basis (*Grund*) avoids, for example, the often seen but mistaken view of the activity of knowledge as mere collection, as mere aggregate of capacities that should be found, analyzed, and then brought into interconnection (cf. Düsing). In clear dismissal of the empirical-psychological process, of temporal sequences, this stepwise process is concerned with the self-development of Geist. From the very beginning this movement is present as thought, a thought that attains its justification along the logical way. The process of this ascension to a determined knowledge „is itself rational and involves a determined, necessary transition by the concept from one determination of intelligible activities into another determination“ (Hegel, Enzyklopädie 1827, 415). In this way, Hegel can determine the contours of a logic of knowledge, of an epistemology in the strict sense, in clear distinction from a mere analytic and synthetic of mental capacities. In *Science of Logic* Hegel had demonstrated the relationships between the particular and the universal, between subjectivity and objectivity; these lie at the basis of the present argument, and gain their practical confirmation through it.

c) The faculty of imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) belongs to the second level of theoretical mind (*Geist*), a level Hegel describes with the term representation (*Vorstellung*). A prominent place in the encyclopedic system belongs to theoretical mind or intellect (in the following I prefer the word intellect). Within the sphere of subjective mind, there occurs the change from the phenomenology, from the standpoint of consciousness, to the standpoint of mind. In this way, we stand at the formal beginning of philosophizing – science must „presuppose the liberation from the opposition of consciousness“ (Hegel, *Logik*, 5: 45). In the preceding stage, the phenomenology, the result was shown to be the one-sidedness of the paradigm of consciousness and the dualism of consciousness and object, of mind and world, of subject and object. Their principle identity was demonstrated in the sense that we aren't concerned with external relations, but rather with an internal relation, with Geist as a self-relation, as a self-determining universal. Everything about which we want to obtain knowledge, all that we want to know, must thus be taken as a self-forming of Geist; it must be understood as Geist – a core moment of monistic idealism.

This being-one implies, in Hegel's words, the identity between the nature posited by the mind as its world and the presupposing of the world as self-standing (*selbständiger*) nature, between the posited and the pre-supposed (*voraus-gesetzten*) world. It has to do with the identity of the determinations as inherent – existing in it and existing as constituted by the Geist. Objectivity shows itself to be subjective and the subjectivity shows itself to be objective.

The path of knowledge as a logical transition, in stages, of theoretical mind, of subjective-intelligible innerness, of abstract self-determining in itself and its expression in the language of knowledge, contains the chief stations: intuition, representation, and thought – whereby fantasy occupies the middle, the seam between *aisthēsis* and *noēsis* (see Fulda 326). The path in question is that from mere certainty to true, justified knowledge. From the form of the external-singular, of common subjective universality, the content – rational in itself – is

raised to the form of true identity of singularity and universality, to determined knowledge. This intellectualizing of knowledge shows the necessity of the translation of the true content from a *still insufficient form inadequate to mind* into the form of the concept. The representation stage or the faculty of imagination is presented as an indispensable transition or middle-stage in the self-constitution of finite subjectivity (Düsing 311-12). **[[Power point seattle2]]**

2. From Intuition to Representation

For these initial stages of the self-determination of intellect, the chief characteristics of intuition must first be briefly outlined. This is the irrevocable presupposition for understanding the faculty of imagination, and it has serious philosophical implications. On the basis of the paradigm of consciousness that has been overcome, intellect doesn't relate to its content as to an object, but rather is related *exclusively* to its own determinations. The separation of its determinations of the subjective and the objective is shown to be a merely apparent one.

The initial form of this logical structure is found in intuition, in which a given, encountered inner or outer sensation (or affection) emerges as an identity of the subjective and the objective. A singular, particular content that reaches the object appears at the same time as posited by a singular, isolated subjectivity. A content that is supposedly only found and appears to be given in the sense of a sensation of outside, a receiving of impressions or the effect of external things, proves itself to be identical with what is posited subjectively, while at the same time the impression of what is objective reveals itself to be the expression of what is subjective – the finding turns out to be positing. „The Myth of the Given“ remains an semblance (appearance) that as such is to be laid open and refuted, which also holds for the opposing „Myth of Construction“. In Hegel's way of reading, the intuition

constitutes the immediate, most present form in which subjectivity relates to its determinations as to a supposedly given, encountered content. Intuition is the immediate presence, the „presentation“ of the singular Ich, here and now - the identity of receptivity and activity in intuition (Hegel, *Geschichte der Philosophie* 19: 205). We are not dealing with a panoply of duplicated intuitions, but rather with the immediate unity of being that already exists and being that is created (Hegel, *Phänomenologie* 231-2). The assertions: „My vision is blue“ and: „There is a blue object“ are identical; in intuition the effect of both propositions is posited as one.

The one that sees and the one seen, hearing and sounding, mind and world, are taken as identical. In this is revealed the simple mind-structure of intuition, its logos-authorship (compare Welsch, esp. 140-52). Pure intuition (as well as pure representation) is an appearance that proves itself to be such; intuition and the faculty of imagination are contaminated by thought from the very beginning. Intuition is sensual *and* intellectual, natural *and* rational at the same time. “That which produces and the product join together in a unity”.¹ ‘Man is always a thinking being...?’ This finds its confirmation by a master of seeing and intuition, Paul Cezanne, who in a conversation with Joachim Gasquet understands the nature that is seen, nature there outside, and the nature that is sensed, nature here inside, as concurrent texts, that penetrate each other (cited in Busch 3: 324).

As the abstract orientation towards something as identical, the attention required for sensation is related to a merely supposedly objective and self-standing being (what is to be paid attention to), which is however an abstract other-being of sensation itself. There is no other content than that of the intuited object, where intellect finds itself thus *apparently* determined from outside. In this way an initial knowledge of the thing is achieved. A

¹ F. W. J. Schelling: *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*. Ausgewählte Schriften, hrsg. v. Manfred Frank, Frankfurt 1985, Bd. 1, S. 528. Compare: „Das Ich ist in einer und derselben Handlung formaliter frei und formaliter gezwungen.“ – „The *Ich* is in one and the same action formally free and formally compelled or passive.“ (Ibid 533)

complete active-knowledge, however, has not yet been presented, but rather at first only an initial sight of the object, not yet an in-sight (*Ein-Sicht*). The side of finding, the side of the given, includes that one be required to treat, as the content of the affection, something existing outside of the subject. So the intuition necessarily projects this content into space and time (Hegel, Enzyklopädie 1970, 8: 83) and intuits it as particular content in these forms. This spatio-temporality is held to be the „first abstract externalization“ (Hegel, Enzyklopädie 1827, 418): Intellect requires a formal milieu in which something is discretely and continuously contrasted with something else. These are indispensable coordinates for the epistemic determination of the contents of feeling.²

Schelling understands the present as a being driven back to a moment, to a point of time to which in reality we cannot return: „In order to be able to intuit the object in general as object, the Ich must posit a past moment as the ground of the present. The past thus originates ever anew only through the action of intellect, and the past is only necessary to the extent that this going back of the Ich is necessary“ (Schelling 554). Here time and movement are given fundamental importance, for it is an event that is intuited. Space and time are, for Hegel, both subjective and objective forms: thus he argues against the one-sidedness both of objectivist concepts (space and time as forms existing in nature) and of the Kantian position (which holds time and space to be merely subjective forms of intuition). Reason thus has not only a regulative relation to knowledge, but also a constitutive one.

Attention requires a pure sinking into the object, the disregard of all other things and of oneself. This displacement into the thing in order to become aware of it is of fundamental relevance and remains indispensable for knowledge. What is at issue here is the total absorption in the thing, without reflection and through a sceptical overcoming of our individuality and our vanity: we let the thing prevail over us – this amounts to a surrender to the object. Thus Hegel strikes polemically against the conventional notion of a

² Rometsch 173. I would like to thank Mr. Rometsch for allowing me to read his dissertation.

good education, which dismisses the object in this sense as unnecessary. Opposed to this renunciation of all pre-judgments and purportedly secure knowledge, opposed to this Pyrrhonian-Buddhist quietude of being in oneself, opposed to this negation of one's own self-validation – a self-validation based on the cancellation of external time, a cancellation that, to be sure, also bears within it the danger of pausing and becoming unfree – there stands the self-validation of subjectivity. The content is also mine, but not merely mine, for subjectivity becomes objective, the objectivity is made subjective.

The form of internality is transformed to the form of externality and vice versa. In this inversion, in this oscillation intellect has climbed the first level of its self-determination, formal self-determinateness. The mere and simple particularity implies a merely common sort of subjective universality (a sort of commonality of intuiting; see Rometsch 173ff.) and the finitude of intuition.

With the movement into the inner, with the remembering, the intuition becomes immediately sublated into representation – it is preserved, negated, and brought to a higher level – wherewith its spatio-temporal determinateness is transformed. The approaching border-crossing is sketched by Hegel as follows: „The course of intellect in representations is to make immediacy likewise internal, to intuitively posit itself in itself, and also to sublimate the subjectivity of internality and in itself to externalize itself from it and to be in itself in its own externality“ (Hegel, Enzyklopädie 1970, 10: 257).

3. Representation

3.1. Remembrance

At the beginning, in the first step, the immediacy valid for intuition, Being is changed, insofar as it is something finite, into something past, but at the same time the intellect preserves the intuition as inner, unconscious presence. „As at first remembering the

intuition, the intellect posits the content of feeling in its internality, in its *own* space and its *own* time” (ibid 10: 258). This content is referred to by Hegel as a picture (image, Bild) that is freed from its first immediacy and abstract singularity and taken up in the universality of the intellectual Ich. It was in this sense that Friedrich Schlegel spoke of the image as a “counter-thing, freed from the control of the thing.” Put in a Kantian way, what is at issue is the capacity to represent an object without its presence in intuition. This unique space-time posited by intellect is valid as universal spatio-temporality in which the content first gains permanence in distinction to past intuition (ibid 10: 259). The space and time of intuition, on the other hand, are particularities, bound to the immediate present of the object. This external space-time is resolved at the price of the original determinateness of the content, which can undergo arbitrary and contingent changes in the shape of my picture (image).

At this level – remembrance as first manner of representing – intellect appears as the unconscious, timeless place of preservation of pictures (images). Indeed, in play on Aristotle, Hegel uses the metaphor, so treasured by Derrida, of the „nocturnal, dark shaft“ in which a world of infinite pictures is preserved (ibid 10: 260). Without being in consciousness, they sleep and are the inactive soul. A countless number of images and representations slumber in this shaft of internality, a powerful reservoir of images that remain hidden by the nocturnal darkness, a dark picture gallery of immeasurable expanse, comparable to the Parisian Louvre without light. These images are indeed the property of intellect. They bear the legal title of inalienable opinions, but are not yet in my actual possession; what is still lacking is the capacity to call up the sleeping images at will. There is lack of will, free power of disposal over this astonishing treasure chamber. All determinations exist in merely virtual possibility. They are contained in seed, but in an

unconscious, dark spring, in the universal existing as such in which what is distinct is not yet posited as discrete.³

What is purely formless, chaotic, and indifferent, this shoreless ocean – the dark side of intellect – is a new form of the universality of intellect. It is like a great chest which I am certain contains a treasure inside, but I cannot distinguish which diverse jewels are preserved there. The images no longer exist, they are no longer there in consciousness, in the past. They exist as “unconscious,” since it is only with the distinction, with the positing of difference in light of the present, that knowing can proceed.

Thus we achieve the bridge from remembrance to the faculty of imagination, the transition to the second stage of representation, to inner presencing, inner representation, by positing of the inner present of the image, the overcoming of the existent, the past. The inner is placed, pre-sented, before the intellect, brought insistently before the inner eye. The waking of the sleeping picture, intellect awakening to itself, enables the relating of the picture to an intuition of like content. The initial creations of the faculty of imagination also appear as a world of spatio-temporally unformed shapes, shapes without mass, positings by which one can be thoroughly displaced. In principle there follows a subsuming, for example, the sensation „blue“ or „sorrow“ under a universal of form – blueness, sorrowfulness. Kant, whom Hegel here follows to a certain extent, spoke of the active capacity of the synthesis of the manifold: „the imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition into an image; it must therefore antecedently take up the impressions into its activity, so previously it must record the impressions in their activity, i.e. apprehend them.“⁴ On the basis of the apprehension, the subsumption of the multiplicity under the unity of

³ [Ibid 260. Elsewhere in respect of the](#) ~~[Ibid 260. Elsewhere in respect of the](#)~~ I (Ich), Hegel speaks of a receptacle, a container and shelter for all and sundry: „Every human being is a total world of representations, which are buried in the night of the I.“ The I is the universal, in which all particulars are abstracted, but in which at the same time everything lies hidden, the abstract universal and the universality, which contains everything in itself. Hegel, Enzyklopädie 1970, 8: 83.

⁴ Immanuel Kant. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. A, 120.

representation, intellect can take internal possession of its property, the images, externalize them, and provide them (in the internal) with the seal of the external. Intellect is able to place what is unique to it in an internal opposition to itself and thus to possess its existence (*Dasein*), to be by itself – internal presencing (Vergegenwärtigung) as free subjectivity of internality.

Already with this subsuming or reflecting as a power of the universal, representation proves itself to be the middle between the immediate finding of oneself determined and thinking as intellect in its perfect freedom. The pure faculty of imagination without thought that is often hypostatized, especially by artists, is a deception. The presentation is essentially infected and determined by thought. It positions itself in the intermundane world of intuition and thinking as their hinge, as the universalization of the sensual, that is, the particular, and the sensualization, the particularization of the universal, the universality of intuition and the making-intuitive of the universal. In this process a special power resides in the deficiency of representing.

Following this lengthy prologue, which was necessary for the comprehension of what follows, I come directly to the topic of this book: the faculty of imagination, fantasy as that which determines the images, the actual transition from finding to inventing, from finding to active finding. Here lie the cornerstones of Hegel's theory of symbolic forms, his logic of signs, which elevated him, according to Derrida, to the founder of modern semiology. **[[power point seattle 4]]**

3. 2. Imagination

a) First Stage: Reproductive Imagination

Images are (as discussed above) internally re-presented. Intellect places these before itself in a new space-time in which the original spatio-temporal concretion is dissolved. On the

basis of this abstraction and the coming-to-be of universal representations, there occurs a contingent and arbitrary reproduction of the content. This supposed occurrence in succession, the attraction between similar images, remains the deed of intellect itself, which subordinates singular intuitions under the internally constituted picture and thus gives itself universality, presenting the universal as something common, re-presenting it (Hegel, Enzyklopädie 1970, 10: 266). Intellect either raises a particular side of a thing into the status of the universal, or it brings fixed form to a concrete universal.

b) Second stage: the productive, associative imagination – fantasy

With the activity of the association of images, the relating of images to one another, the intellect climbs to a further step, that of fantasy. This involves the activity of free joining, synthesizing, or combining pictures and representations, the inventive inner presentation itself of created representations, a freely willed production of new images. This creative imagination, the imagined synthesis, cares for the uncreative sensualization, the making of the content into an intuition without a concrete example. In consequence of the transition from an objective connection to an innovative subjective bond, internal-imaginative existence is conferred to a self-constituting content originating from the intellect itself, whereby the self-intuition of the intellect is perfected - the power of forming images to itself.

Taken in anticipation, the intellect emerges as a single, concrete subjectivity determined in itself with its own content, and it demonstrates here the already present universality of thinking, whose justification is already at play from the very beginning. The representations are anticipations of a concept yet to be constructed. The intellect demonstrates its sovereignty over the stock of images and representations belonging to it, fantasy as the gentle power over the pictures (images) (Hume 58).

In fantasy we now have, consciously posited in arbitrary freedom by the intellect, a new, second present, a higher identity of universal and singular. What is found and what belongs to the intellect are completely posited in a unity, with fantasy being the capacity of plastic construction and the images of fantasy presenting the unification of what is inner or mental and what is intuitive. In this the intellect proves its power over images, raising itself to the soul of images and seeking thereby to give itself validity and objectivity, and manifest and preserve itself in its own creations. Hegel sees the identity of singularity and universality at this higher stage as consisting in the intellect, now constituted as a singularity in the form of a concrete subjectivity in which the self-relation – the basic structure of the mind – is determined as being and as universality by means of the intuition of the universal and the universalization of the intuition (Hegel, Enzyklopädie 1970, 10: 268).

The intellect creates novel inner worlds, a cosmos of the coming-to-be and passing away of possibilities, numerous inner word-images. It appears as unbridled picture-giving power, as the untiring and active inner picture hewer, as free play with possibilities. There is (writes Hume) nothing more worthy of wonder than the readiness with which the imagination assembles its representations, „hurrying from one end of the universe to the other to assemble the representations that belong to the object“ (Hume 38). Kant sees here the disclosure of an „unpredictable field of related representations“ in which the content, a determined concept, could „be aesthetically extended in an unlimited way“.⁵ Thus the creative imagination is able to promulgate itself inexhaustively in its own products. According to Hegel, this play of fantasy constitutes the universal foundation of art, its formal aspect, presenting the true universal in the form of the singular image (Hegel, Enzyklopädie 1970, 10: 267).

But the play of fantasy has a double aspect: being restless and without rules, the form of representation implies an indifferent external arrangement of the multiform images

⁵ Kant: Kritik der Urteilskraft, KdU § 49, 195.

with their many meanings. Creativity, activity, and restlessness always remain ambivalent qualities; they do not in themselves guarantee a successful product. Non-creativity tranquillity, passivity and simple letting be, are by no means to be devalued from the outset, for they are the very foundation of the faculty of imagination. Fantasy is able to create the human and the inhuman, to build heaven and hell, and thus to demonstrate its power as well as its deficiency. It can darken the present with shadows cast back from the past and others from the future budged closer (Schelling). This play is capable – like the understanding – of revealing monstrosities of all kinds. According to Hegel, in this synthesis of the faculty of imagination we are only concerned with formal reason, for it presents neither the highest capacity of free being nor completely successful making-present.⁶ The content as such is indifferent to fantasy, for thought hasn't yet attained the form appropriate to the content. It is only in thought, which conceptualizes, tests, and verifies, that universality and singularity are completely identical and content and conceptual form coincide. **[[power point seattle6]]**

Fantasy and Appearance (*Schein*)

When *phainesthai* is taken in a substantive way, *phantasia* has the meaning of appearing. We thereby unintentionally come upon the domain of Pyrrhonian skepticism, the true champion of the appearances. Its criterion is what appears, the *phaenomenon*, which we are to understand as the image, *phantasia*, and the subjective aspect of my imaging, that is, the appearing as subjectively holding something to be true. As enduring positions of skepticism, negativity, subjectivity, relativity, and *ataraxia* have their way of communication in the language of appearance. Fantasy has the function of a necessary

⁶ In Christianity, according to Hegel, the reconciliation of the god-human takes place in the past; that of the human in the future; while in the present no reconciliation is possible. See further: Vieweg, Religion.

transition point on the path to knowing and, like skepticism, presents a Janus-face: one free and the other not free, one steadfast and the other negative, one tranquil and the other restless, one happy and the other unhappy, for the countenance of imagination is an amalgamation of the phenomenal and the logical, of image and concept (see further Vieweg, Skepsis).

As is well-known, art that has its formal source in fantasy is considered to be free play with appearance or a world of appearance. Such activity of fantasy is described by Schiller as an idealization. According to Humboldt, art, as a facultas fingendi, creates a non-reality, a picture and appearance that surpasses all reality. Imagination or fantasy can thus also be understood as ideation. In its images, in its thoroughly ambivalent imaginings, fantasy is freer than nature. The sphere of the external and internal empirical world, the lights of the world and the firing of the neurons, are not a world of true reality, but rather, in the yet stronger sense used in art, they are mere appearance, appearance of being, though also bearing the stamp of contingency and arbitrary will. Only art based on beautiful fantasy offers appearances a „higher reality born of Geist” (Hegel, Ästhetik 13: 22). So, far from being mere illusion (Schein), it is the appearances of art – and not of the usual reality – that are to be characterized as the higher reality and the truer existence, for they are the ways the universal is made present. They are monograms of the absolute (Schelling), though not its highest way of being presented.

c) Third Stage: Sign-making Fantasy

The creations of fantasy initially remain only internal and subjective, for their images are particular and only subjectively capable of intuition. Still missing is the moment of being, the external-ization, creating the present in the external, external neo-representation as a step towards objectification. What is perfected in inner self-intuition, the mere synthesis of

concept and intuition, the merely internal and subjective, must be determined as being and be made into an external object. In this activity, in externalizing, intellect produces new intuitions and so, at this higher level, we return to the point of departure of “intuition.” In the sign (*Zeichen*) actual vividness (*Anschaulichkeit*) is added to the self-constituted representation. The intellect makes itself, as Hegel puts it, into a thing, into an object in which merely singularized subjectivity is transgressed. It becomes sign-making fantasy. In this passage occur the basic features of Hegel’s semiology, including his philosophical concept of language, of linguistic signs. Here Hegel appears as one of the founders of the modern philosophical understanding of language.

Since at the level of fantasy the intellect relates to itself in arbitrary freedom and identity, it has already turned back to immediacy and so must set out what it has itself created, the pictures and representations, as existing and objectified, and thus fulfill the mind-structure in a higher way. The sign-making fantasy constitutes a unity of self-created, self-standing representations and an intuition – again a higher identity of subjectivity and objectivity. To an arbitrarily chosen external object an alien meaning is attributed or offered. In consequence of this arbitrary attribution, the immediate and characteristic content of intuition disappears and to the intuition another content is given for its inner soul, for its meaning: E. Cassirer calls it content of meaning. An intuition is radically transformed into the possession of the intellect, handed over to the full sovereignty of intellect, and a fulfilled space-time is created, culminating in language, in the time of the tone and the space of the letter. In this construction, in the creative finding (*Er-Findung*) of a sign-world, the intellect proves itself to be the sovereign of the sign and of meanings, the free-ruling semantic power that is able to preserve our knowledge and our wisdom, make them endure, and make them communicable. This is the *mnemosyne* that constitutes the formal foundation of history.

As metaphor for the sign Hegel uses the pyramid that Derrida used for the title of an essay (Derrida; cf. Vieweg, *Das Bildliche*). The circle from shaft to pyramid concludes: „The

sign is any immediate intuition that presents a completely different content than what it has for itself – the pyramid in which an alien soul is displaced and preserved“ (Hegel, Enzyklopädie 10: 270). At a higher level a mind-structure is again attained, in particular, mind-born language that, with its logos-constitution, its inner logic, indicates the transition to a thinking that has its appropriate form in language. **[[power point seattle7]]**

The imagination stands between intuition and thought and thus fails to achieve the perfect identity of self-relation and self-determination in the form of thought thinking itself. The true iconoclasm of conceptual thought as Hegel conceives it remains beyond the reach of the imagination.⁷ But that would be another story.

Translated from the German by Timothy C. Huson (~~Kanton~~). ~~All translations from Hegel are likewise by T. Huson.~~

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⁷ „In thinking, I am free, because I am not in an other, but remain simply and solely in communion with myself.“ Hegel, Phänomenologie 3: 156.

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